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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

IDA AND J AlVIES WILLIAMS,)
Plaintiffs and Appellant)
vs.
,I Case No. 8614
ZIONS COOPERATIVE
)
::MERCANTILE INSTITUTION,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Respondent joins with the Appellant 1n
referring to the parties throughout as they appeared
at the trial, i.e., the Respondent being the Defendant
therein and the Appellant being the Plaintiff, Ida
Williams only. Basically the Defendant joins in the
statement of facts as found in Appellant's Brief
with the observations and slight variations as shown
herein.
3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as recited by the Plaintiff herein as to the date and place of the accident
and as to the motion of the Defendant are all accurately stated. Since the sole issue in this appeal
is as to whether or not the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the fact as stated
by the Plaintiff and with which the Defendant cannot agree is recited as follows:
''.After Plaintiff had started into the intersection, when her car was about 25 feet from the
panel truck, it suddenly pulled out of the intersection.'' (R. 63, 65)
The Plaintiff herself testified that from a point
25 feet north of the intersection, she did not see nor
look in the direction of the truck again until after
the point of impact. (R. 50) The only witness to
testify as to the position of the vehicles as they entered the intersection was the passenger in the automobile of the Plaintiff, ~Irs. Singleton, who testified
as follows:

•· Q. 'Yhere were you in the intersection
when you saw the truck start to pull out~
niH. COXDER: I think that would be imnwtt•rial as far as this witness is concerned.

THE COURT: I will let her answer.
A. \\~ (' hadn ~t got into it exactly.'~ (R. 63)
HTATE:\IENT OF POINTS

rrllE COlTHT DID NOT ERR IN RULING
4
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AS A MATTER OF LA-W THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AND
THAT SUCH CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED
TO THE ACCIDENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
RULING AS . A. MATTER OF LAW THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS CONrr,RIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE
PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED
TO THE ACCIDENT.
We will concede that this court upon reviewing
the evidence where there has been a directed verdict
must review it in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff in determining whether the Court erred
in taking the case from the Jury (See N ielse·n v.
Mauchley, (1949) 115 Utah 86, 202 P. 2d 547). However, since the motion was made at the end of the
Plaintiff's case, it will mean that this Court should
consider the v1hole record on appeal. The evidence
in this case is uncontradicted that the Defendant's
truck was stopped at the stop sign on Third Avenue
and facing east. (R. 50) The Plaintiff was traveling
south on '' B '' Street. The Plaintiff was 25 feet
north of the intersection when she saw the Defendant's truck, (R. 50) and she assumed that the truck
would wait for her to clear through the intersection.
She thereafter traversed the 25 feet and the north
one-half of the intersection before the impact and
never again looked to see the truck until the n1oment
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of impact. During all of this time she was traveling only 20 miles per hour. It should be noted that
she testified on direct examination that she was
traveling 25 miles per hour (R. 16), however, on
cross-examination she changed her speed to only
20 miles per hour (R. 51). This was the same figure
that she had given in her deposition. (R. 52) The
testimony of a witness on his direct examination is
no stronger than as modified or left by his further
examination or cross-examination. (See Alvarado
v. Tucker (1954), 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986)
Furthermore, the testimony that the speed was between 20 and 25 miles per hour can only support a
finding of 20 miles per hour. (See Alvarado v.
Tucker, supra.)
The Plaintiff further testified that there was
no other traffic in the vicinity. (R. 49) The Plaintiff
further called as a witness Mrs. Singleton, a passenger in the Plaintiff's car, who testified that the
Defendant's truck started into the intersection before the Plaintiff had reached the intersection. (R
63) These facts present two distinct problems for
the court's consideration. First, whether or not the
Plaintiff on the favored highway owed a duty in
this particular case to observe what is happening
to the vehicle on the disfavored highway, which she
failed to discharge. This matter has heretofore been
discussed by our Court in the cases of H-ickok v.
Skinner, (1948), 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 514, and
Conklin v. Walsh, (1948), 113 Utah 276, 193 P.2d
437, which cases will be discussed in greater detail
herein. The seeond proble1n presented. is whether
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or not under these facts, the Defendant having once
stopped for the stop sign and yielded the right of
way to all vehicles in the immediate vicinity at the
time of stopping at the stop sign then had the right
of way and the Plaintiff o\ved a duty to yield the
right of way by reason of U.C.A., 1953, Sees. 41-6-72
and 41-6-74.
In the case of Srnith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279
Pac. 893, we have a fact situation involving a city
ordinance requiring the inviduals to stop at an arterial or through highway and requiring the individual to yield the right of way to vehicles approaching from the left. That case involved an accident
at Atkins Avenue and Highland Drive. There \vas
a dispute in the evidence as to whether or not the
Defendant had stopped at the stop sign. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, and
the Defendant appealed. This court revel·sed the
jury's decision based upon certain of the instructions
of the court. The court in discussing the law held:
''If the respondent stopped immediately before entering Highland Drive, he complied with
all the requirements of the ordinance. From that
moment he was free to move without restriction,
so far as the ordinance is concerned. As he approached Highland Drive after stopping, the
statute gave him the right of way as against
automobiles corning in the direction the respondent was traveling, and made it the duty of such
persons approaching from the left to yield the
right of vvay. But these rights were only relative, and must be applied in the light of the conditions existing at the time.''
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This then leads us, in the instant case, to the
question, after the Defendant has complied with the
statute by stopping and yielding the right of way
which of the two vehicles entering the intersection
from different highways, has the right of way. The
statutory provision U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 41-6-72 (b)
says:
''When two vehicles enter an intersection
from different highways and at the same time
the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield
the right of way to the vehicle on the right.''
Since in our principal case the Defendant's vehicle was proceeding from the west and going east
and the Plaintiff's vehicle was proceeding from
the north and going south, the Plaintiff's vehicle
would be the one on the left if the two vehicles entered the intersection at the same time.
An examination of the record to show which
vehicle entered the intersection first shows by the
testimony of J\1rs. Singleton, who was the only witness to the accident and saw the vehicles as they
entered the intersection, that the Plaintiff had not
entered the intersection when the Defendant's truck
started to pull out. (R. 63)
This then leads to the second inescapable conclusion that the Plaintiff was negligent in failing to
yield the right of way since the Defendant had already entered the intersection from a different highway. The statutory provision of U.C.A. 1953, Sec.
41-6-72 (a) states:
''The driver of a Yehicle approaching an in8
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tersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle
which has entered the intersection from a different highway.''
At the time J\tirs. Williams saw the Defendant's
truck she testified she was 25 feet north of the intersection. (R. 50) She would then have besides the
25 feet north of the intersection also the one-half
of the width of the intersection there as a distance
to travel before the impact. She also testified that
she was traveling about 20 miles an hour (R. 51) at
the time she saw the Defendant's vehicle. Thus taking the testimony of the Plaintiff in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, the Defendant had stopped
and yielded to the vehicles in the immediate vicinity
at the tilne that he stopped at the intersection. Although the Defendant's driver was not called as a
witness to testify the testimony of the Plaintiff
would clearly indicate this. ~rhe fact that the Plaintiff was under a duty of care for her own safety
even though she was traveling upon the favored
highway is well established in the law.
The case of Hickok v. Skinner, (1948), 113 Utah
1, 190 P.2d 514, is a case which has been recognized
by this court and has laid down the well establishe::l
rule that regardless of which driver is technically
entitled to the right of way, both drivers must execute due care and caution for their own safety in
proceeding into and across intersections:
"While the burden to drive so carefully as
always to be prepared for, and to be able to avoid,
the negligence of another should not be placed
on either driver, there should be placed on both
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the burden to keep a proper lookout and to use
reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither
should be permitted to close his eyes to other vehicles which he knows or has reason to believe
are approaching, simply beca.use a state statute
or municipal ordinance designates him the preferred driver. The rights of drivers approaching
and crossing intersections are relative. Both
drivers have the duties of being heedful and of
maintaining a proper lookout. Plaintiff was
neglectful in both particulars, and no jury could
reasonably find that he was not negligent.'' (Emphasis Added)

Blashfield Cyclopedia of Autornobile Law &
Practice, Perm. Ed. Vol. 2, Section 1037 at page 354
states the following :
''A driver who attempts to cross an intersection looking directly ahead, without looking up
intersecting streets for approaching vehicles, and
collides with a vehicle approaching from such
street, must be deemed guilty of negligence per
se, if, had he looked before attempting to cross,
he would have seen the colliding car coming a
short distance away."
Such is certainly the case here. Having observed
the Defendant's vehicle stopped at a stop sign, the
Plaintiff testified that she then looked straight
ahead and failed ever again to look to the right to see
what the Defendant's automobile was doing, and before Plaintiff entered the intersection, the Defendant's automobile was entering the intersection according to the testhnony of 1\Irs. Singleton the witness in the automobile heretofore referred to.
1.0
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The facts of the principal case clearly come within the facts of the case of Conklin v. Walsh, supra.
In that case the Defendant was traveling east on
South Temple and the Plaintiff's automobile was
coming south on '' 0'' Street. South Temple was
the favored highway with stop signs protecting it at
the intersection of '' 0'' Street. The important question raised in this case is whether or not the Defendant was negligent as a matter of law. Mrs. Conklin
testified that she stopped at the stop sign approaching South Temple. Defendant truck driver testified
that he saw her approaching the stop sign but failed
to see her stop. The court held :
''The difficult question in this case is whether or not the record established that the driver
of the Walsh truck was guilty of negligence as
a matter of law. J.1frs. Conklin's testimony that
she stopped is uncontradicted. Walsh was traveling an arterial highway at a fairly rapid rate
of speed. He was some considerable distance
west of the intersection when he saw the other
car approaching from the side street controlled
by a stop sign. He thereafter completely ignored
the Conklin car and drove blindly ahead without
again checking the position and movement of
the other car until too late to avoid colliding W'ith
it. The defendant truck driver was not justified
in thus ignoring the movement of plaintiff's
automobile. The duty to keep a proper lookout
applies as well to the favored as to the disfavored
driver. Neither driver can excuse his own failure to observe because the other driver failed in
his duty. Neither driver is at any time to be excused for want of vigilance or failure to see what
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is plain to be seen. Drivers are permitted to
cross over arterial highways after having
stopped. True, they must yield the right of way
to cars which are close enough to consitute an immediate hazard. This rule, however, requires the
exercise of some judgement. There is still a duty
on the part of the driver traveling the arterial
highway to remain reasonably alert to the possibility of the disfavored driver starting across
the intersection in the belief that he can cross
in safety. The duty of keeping a proper lookout
attends all those operating motor vehicles, and
other rules of the road do not relieve any driver
of the necessity of complying with this requirement." (Emphasis Added)
The trial court found in this case that the Defendant was negligent as a matter of law and this
court on appeal affirmed that decision by saying:
''The driver having failed to see Plaintiff's
automobile until too late to aYoid the collision,
we see no escape from the conclusion that he did
not keep a proper lookout and was guilty of negligence in that omission. The trial court so
held.''
The next case to reach this court is the case of
Nielson v. Mauchlcy, (1949), 115 Utah 68, 202 P.2d
547. In this case the Plaintiff \Yas traYeling along
an icy road and failed to see a school bus backing
out of a yard until too late to avoid the collision.
The trial court held that there \Yas negligence as a
matter of law and directed a Y<-•rdict of no cause of
action, which this court reYersed because the question of whether or not h<-• had been trayeling too
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fast and been able to avoid the collision were facts
which should have been submitted to the jury. However, the court recognized and again reiterated the
doctrine held in Hickok v. Skinner, supra, and Conklin v. Walsh, supra. The court said:
"The mere fact that Plaintiff had the right
of way did not give him a right of proceed without regard to existing conditions. He must exercise due care and act as a reasonably prudent
man would act under all pre-existing curcumstances. ''
Again we say to the court that in this particular
case Mrs. Williams when 25 feet north of the intersection gave an utter disregard to the position of
the Defendant herein and then proceeded blindly
on into and through the intersection.
The next case to consider the rights and liabilities of the drivers at intersections is the case of
Gren v. Norton (1949), 117 Utah 121, 213 P.2d 356.
In this case the Plaintiff entered the intersection
of 12th North and 5th West Street in Provo after
apparently stopping for a stop sign on 12th North
Street. The witnesses testified that the Plaintiff
failed to observe the Defendant until shortly before
the impact even though he had ample opportunity
to do so. This court upon appeal held that the Plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. The
court held:
''As we held in the Hickok vs. Skinner case,
supra, the fact that the statute gives a motorist
a right-of-way into an intersection does not permit him to proceed across without observing the
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movement of other vehicles which may be moving into and across the intersection ... In this
particular instance deceased was traveling at a
slow rate of speed, should have seen the truck
aproaching, and could have stopped his car in a
very short .distance. He should not be charged
with avoiding defendant's negligence but he is
required to maintain a reasonable lookout for his
own safety."
The next case of this court to consider this point
is the case of Spackman v. Carson, (1950), 117 Utah
390, 216 P .2d 640. In this case the Defendant had
a truck parked off from the highway and the Plaintiff traveling on a motorcycle failed to observ~ the
Defendant truck as it proceeded onto the highway
and going in the same direction and angled onto the
highway. The appeal raised the issue whether or
not the lower court erred in denying Defendant's
motion for a directed verdict. The court in analyzing
this case stated that it was a close case and observed
that it was not a case of a vehicle parked off the highway under such circumstances as would ''give warning that the driver had moved off the pavement onto
the shoulder of the road only momentarily and might
at any moment 1nove back onto it as frequentl~T happens with the traveling public." Certainly in the
instant case which we have before us now. the Plaintiff should have been a ware that the Defendant was
in a position at any moment to 1nove forward into
the intersection since he had already stopped for the
stop sign.
The court goes on to refer to the case of Conklin
v. lValsh, supra, and distinguishes the two cases by
14
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saying:
''Clearly, that case has no application here
because there, unlike the instant case, the vehicles which moved onto the arterial highway was
about to enter the arterial highway when first observed by the driver of the vehicle on the arterial
highway and hence the latter was alerted to the
possibility that the right of way might not be
yielded to him.''
Certainly in the instant case that application of
the Conklin-Walsh doctrine is clearly applicable.
The Plaintiff should have been alerted to the fact
that the Defendant at any moment was about to move
into the intersection, and yet in utter disregard of
the Defendant's position the Plaintiff continued on
without even looking to the Defendant's truck. The
Plaintiff obviously had the duty to see what was
there to be seen (Mingus v. Olsson, (1949) 114 Utah
505, 201 P.2d 495) and had the Plaintiff observed
the Defendant's movements before entering the intersection the Plaintiff would have observed that the
Defendant had started forward and was entering
the intersection. (R. 63) This is the testimony of
Mrs. Singleton, the eye witness.
The next case to consider this particular point
of intersection accidents is the case of Poulsen v.
Nlanness, (1952) 121 Utah 269, 241 P.2d 152. This
case involves the intersection of two country roads
with no stop signs at the intersection. The court held
that the right of way between the two cars was a
matter for the jury. Justice Wolfe in his concurring
opinion made the observation that this case differs

lf>
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from the usual circumstances of city intersections as
against the intersections out in the country. Certainly a greater degree of care is required of a driver
on traveling the city streets where the traffic is much
more congested and cars are traversing intersections
at frequent intervals.
In the case of Martin v. Stevens, (1952) 121 Utah
484, 243 P.2d 747, we have an intersection case involving 18th East and Stratford Avenue in Salt Lake
City. In that case there were no traffic signals or
signs controlling traffic at the intersection. The
matter of the negligence of the Plaintiff was discussed in the case but the testimony shows that the
Plaintiff failed to see the Defendant's automobile
until too late to avoid the accident. The court again
reviewed the Conklin v. Walsh doctrine and the other
cases in support thereof and made this observation:
''In order to avoid burdening this opinion
with a repetition and analysis of each of these
cases, one principal which distinguishes them
from the case at bar can be suc~-inctly stated:
Each of them was decided upon the proposition
that the circurnstances were such that the driver
held to be negligent as a matter of la1t', either
observed, or in the c.ce rcise of due care should
have obserrcd, the manner in which the other
driver was approaching the -intersection and
clearly could by ordinary reasonable care have
avo1:ded the coll-1:sion. Or to state it in other
words, the negligence, or manner of dri'viug, of
the other driver teas such tl1at the drit·er appraising tl1 f situation 1t'as al f rtfd to it or by using dtte
care 1conld have been so alerted hz time so that
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by the exercise of ordinary precaution he could
have avoided the collision. And, in each of these
cases, this seemed to the court so clearly manifest that reasonable minds could not find to the
contrary.'' (Emphasis Added)
The latest case the writer is able to find involving an intersection accident and discussed by this
court is the case of Bates v. Burns, et al, (1956) 3
Utah 2d 180, 281 P.2d 209. In this case the Plaintiff's vehicle had been the one to stop at a stop sign
and then had proceeded into the intersection. There
was considerable conflict in the testimony as to the
respective distances and speeds of the two vehicles.
As the Plaintiff entered the intersection he \Vaf,
looking for traffic approaching from the west. This
would be the direction from which the traffic would
be coming as he crossed the first half of the highway.
l-Ie then looked for the traffic coming from the east
as he was approaching the center of the highway.
This court in discussing this evidence and construing
the law said that it would be a jury question, but
again recognized that a person on a favored highway has the duty to observe all conditions for his
own safety and affirmed the doctrine of the Conklin
v. Walsh case. Certainly in the principal case the
Plaintiff failed to observe the Defendant's vehicle
which was stopped on her right side and the position of nearest approach to the intersection. This
was true even after she observed that there was no
traffic coming from the left and approaching the
intersection.
The case of Hundley v. United States (1955)
131 F. Supp. 655 involves an intersection accident

17
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between an army vehicle which had stopped for a
stop sign and a motorist traveling about 15 miles
per hour on a favored highway. Because of the icefog condition, the motorist's visibility was limited
to 30 feet and in this case the court found that the
motorist was guiltJ of contributorily negligence in
failing to keep a proper lookout and in assuming
that the vehicle which had stopped for the stop sign
would remain at the stop sign. Obviously these facts
are applicable to the instant case because the Plaintiff assumed that the Defendant would remain
stopped at the stop sign and failed to give heed to
his position any more than that.

CONCLUSION
The result in this case should be the affirmation of the lower courts ruling that the Plaintiff,
Mrs. Ida Williams, was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law, which negligence proxin1ately contributed to or caused the accident herein since she
failed to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent
person under like or similar circumstances.
Respectfully submitted,

DEAN E. CONDER
NIELSE~- .A~D

CONDER

.ALBERT R. BOWEN
Attorneys for Respondent
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